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USING SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ISOMORPHISM TO
EVALUATE THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIME CHANGE
THROUGH TRADE SANCTIONS
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Trade sanctions occur when one polity institutes a policy that
limits or prohibits trade with another polity to support a policy
largely unrelated to trade. Trade sanctions have a long history.
Scholars often point to the Megarian Decree, in which Pericles
banned all trade between his Athenian Empire and the state of
Megara in 432 B.C.E., as one of the earliest uses of trade sanctions.1
Some argue that Pericles hoped that using economic tools against
Megara would prevent war with Sparta; others suggest that
Pericles merely wanted to punish the Megarians for their support
of Corinth—in either case the trade measure supported another
policy.2
Most scholars agree that Pericles’s trade sanction
contributed to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.3
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania. Sarah Krasny provided valuable
research assistance for this Article.
1 See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1168 n.18 (1987) (describing the trade
limitations imposed by Pericles and their role in starting the Peloponnesian War);
Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: An Overview, in
SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 1 (Steve Chan & A.
Cooper Drury eds., 2000) (describing the political motivations and the events
arising out of the Megarian Decree).
2 Chan & Drury, supra note 1, at 1.
3 See, e.g., Thihan Myo Nyun, Feeling Good or Doing Good: Inefficacy of the U.S.
Unilateral Sanctions Against the Military Government of Burma/Myanmar, 7 WASH. U.
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As could be expected of a practice engaged in for millennia,
trade sanctions have generated voluminous literature.4 Many
scholars have analyzed sanctions through economic theory or
using quantitative explanation.5 Some have based their analyses
on political science.6 Some, of course, have analyzed trade
sanctions as a matter of law.7 Economics, international relations,
and other disciplines have enriched legal analyses of trade
sanctions. While law has been happy to borrow from those
disciplines, however, it has not yet turned to the tools of
institutional sociologists.
This Article takes that step. Institutional sociologists have
developed theories that explain the process whereby institutions
converge. Institutions, in turn, shape and guide behavior. Thus,
changes in institutions will lead to changes in behavior, and
convergences in institutions should lead to similar behavior. If a
goal of trade sanctions is to force another nation to act in a manner
similar to the sanctioning nation and its peers, then this
sociological theory of isomorphism could have powerful
explanatory and predictive effects.
In order to determine if sociological theories of institutional
convergence apply to trade sanctions, this Article first must
determine the objectives sought by nations that apply sanctions.8
There are several goals; to speak of or analyze trade sanctions as a
unitary phenomenon is for the most part nonsensical. One type of
trade sanction does seek to bring the behavior of target nations into

GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 455, 461 (2008) (stating that barring trade between Megara
and allies eventually led to the Peloponnesian War); see also THUCYDIDES, THE
LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 80
(Robert B. Strassler ed., Richard Crawley trans., Free Press 1996) (stating that the
Spartans demanded rescission of the Megarian decree to prevent war).
4 A useful bibliography can be found at Global Policy Forum, Sanctions
Bibliography, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/bibliog.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009).
5 See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED
(3d ed. 2007) (providing a database of economic sanctions and evaluating the
relative efficacy of these measures).
6 See, e.g., DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999) (discussing the role of economic
coercion in international relations).
7 See, e.g., MICHAEL P. MALLOY, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 145–204 (2001) (discussing the role of economic sanctions in
contemporary U.S. legal practice).
8 See infra Section 2.
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line with the behavior of sanctioning nations and their peers,9 and
thus presents the possibility for examination through the lens of
theories of isomorphism. A paradigmatic example of this type of
sanction is the United States’ embargo of the Republic of Cuba; this
Article briefly reviews the history of that island.10 The Article then
explains three different but non-exclusive theories of isomorphism:
normative isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and coercive
isomorphism.11 Application of those theories to the embargo of
Cuba explains the failure of that particular trade sanction.12
Moreover, theories of isomorphism suggest that unilateral
sanctions will often fail to cause the desired change in behavior.13
2.

TYPES OF TRADE SANCTIONS

As the debate over the reasons for Pericles’s sanctions of
Megara illustrates, nations can impose economic sanctions for a
variety of reasons. Reasons that a nation might impose economic
sanctions include commercial impulses, denial of a discrete good
or piece of technology, rule enforcement, and expression of
preferences. A country may also impose sanctions as a means of
causing another country to change its behavior. Because nations
impose different types of sanctions to achieve different goals (or as
a response to different impulses), evaluations of “success” or
“costs” require careful distinction among these types.
2.1. Commercial Impulses
A broad set of commercial impulses explains one type of trade
sanction.
Of these commercial impulses, protectionism is
discussed most often.14 A ban imposed by Australia, for example,
on uncooked salmon from the Pacific Rim of North America was
ostensibly imposed in order to prevent the introduction of exotic

See infra Section 2.5.
See infra Section 3.
11 See infra Section 4.
12 See infra Section 5.
13 See infra Section 5.4.
14 E.g., Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the
Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2131–32, 2136–45 (1995) (discussing attempts
by the United States to protect environmental interests by utilizing legislation that
restricted specific types of trade with neighboring countries).
9

10
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diseases to Australian fish stock.15 However, because Australia
imposed a ban on uncooked salmon but did not impose a similar
ban on herring or ornamental fin-fish, both of which presented as
much, or even more, of a risk to Australian fish stock, and because
the scientific study Australia used to justify its ban did not contain
an evaluation of the likelihood of the spread of disease, the World
Trade Organization found that the sanction imposed by Australia
was actually intended to protect the domestic Australian
industry.16 Similarly, the World Trade Organization found no
scientific support for a Japanese ban on apples from the United
States ostensibly imposed to protect Japanese apples from larvae of
the coddling moth, and found instead that the measure was
unreasonably protectionist.17 One of the earliest rulings within the
World Trade Organization found that a ban on reformulated
gasoline that did not meet specified quality standards was not in
fact an environmental measure but was actually a protectionist
action by the United States.18
15 See Matthew D. Taylor, The WTO Panel Decision on Australia’s Salmon Import
Guidelines: Evidence that the SPS Agreement can Effectively Protect Human Health
Interests, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 473, 473 (2000) (describing an Australian
measure, the Quarantine Proclamation 86A, that was enacted to protect diverse
recreational fisheries in Australia).
16 Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of
Salmon, ¶ 170, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998). Canada complained to the World
Trade Organization that the Australian sanction violated Australia’s obligations
pursuant to its membership in that organization. See Andrew P. Thomson,
Australia—Salmon and Compliance Issues Surrounding the SPS Agreement: Sovereign
Acceptance and Measure Adaptation, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 717, 725–26 (2002)
(describing Canada and Australia’s agreements before the World Trade
Organization). The World Trade Organization has a process for resolving
complaints lodged by members against other members; that process resulted in
the finding by the World Trade Organization. For discussions and explanations
of the dispute settlement process within the World Trade Organization, see
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1–
57 (1997); Carlos M. Vásquez & John H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance
with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 555, 556–62
(2002).
17 Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, ¶ 9.1,
WT/DS76/R (Oct. 27, 1998); see Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review
2003, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 422–39 (2004) (discussing the dispute
between the United States and Japan); Joseph P. Whitlock, Japan—Measures
Affecting Agricultural Products: Lessons for Future SPS and Agricultural Trade
Disputes, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 741, 748–54 (2002) (discussing the dispute).
18 Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, ¶ 4.8 WT/052/9 (May 20, 1996). The United States—against the explicit
advice of its own International Trade Representative—created different,
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The law regarding these types of sanctions is relatively clear.
The international trade regime, as administered by the World
Trade Organization, is built on two strict foundational
requirements and one softer requirement.19
The first strict
requirement, the “most favored nation” principal, requires that all
participating nations receive equal treatment at the border: nations
cannot discriminate among goods on the basis of country of
origin.20 The second strict requirement, the “national treatment”
principle, requires that once inside the customs territory of a nation
all goods from participating nations shall receive the same
treatment as goods that originated domestically.21 The third,
somewhat softer requirement is that all barriers at the border be
converted into tariffs, so that as those tariffs are negotiated
downward there eventually will be unfettered trade among all of
the participants in the international trade regime.22

discriminatory standards for gasoline originating outside of the United States;
substantial evidence suggested that Congress worked with domestic producers to
create a protectionist sanction.
See Philip M. Nichols, Participation of
Nongovernmental Parties in the World Trade Organization: Extension of Standing in
World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 295, 297 n.14 (1996) (describing the protectionist nature of the measure).
19 For a discussion of the administration of the international trade regime by
the World Trade Organization, see John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian,
Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000); G.
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995).
20 See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 230, 231 (1992)
(referring to the most favored nation requirement as a “bedrock” of the
international trade regime); David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO
Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 407 (1998) (referring to the most
favored nation requirement as the “first and most basic provision” of the
international trade regime).
21 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 271
(1997) (placing national treatment and most favored nation principle “[a]t the
core” of the international trade regime); Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax
Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 139, 165 (2003) (describing national treatment as one of the “key
principles” of the international trade regime).
22 See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 379, 439 (1996)
(discussing how the General Agreement intended to promote equal competition
by forbidding trade barriers other than tariffs).
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A scattering of exceptions perforate these requirements.23 One
exception specifically allows countries to sanction trade for
commercial purposes. Through a provision known as the “escape
clause,” sanctions may be imposed when unforeseen events lead to
an increase in imports that threatens or foreseeably threatens
serious injury to a domestic industry.24 If a country uses the escape
clause to sanction goods from another country, then that country
may in turn impose increased tariffs equal in value to the sanction
on goods from the first country.25 The escape clause thus provides
a balanced measure whereby countries can react to short term
changes in the trade environment without renegotiating the
entirety of the international trade regime.26
The purpose of sanctions imposed to promote the commercial
prosperity of a nation dictates the measurement of the “success” of
such sanctions. Scholars and policymakers would attempt to find a
causal link between the sanction and domestic economic growth,
and would then try to measure the amount of growth attributable
to the sanction. If the sanctions lead to economic growth, then they
would be considered successful.27
2.2. Denial of a Discrete Piece of Technology or Input
A related type of sanction seeks to deny a discrete piece of
technology or input to a specific actor or set of international actors.
The United States, for example, “has three export control
regulations in place that prohibit the unlicensed ‘export’ or ‘re23 See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 335 (1990)
(comparing the exceptions to “a crust of barnacles, weighing it down with
provisos and exclusions”).
24 Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792,
818–19 (2001). Charnovitz notes that “[t]he trading system has always recognized
the need for a safety valve to let governments derogate from trade rules.” Id. at
818.
25 See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Enforcement, Private Political Pressure,
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape
Clause, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 474–75 (2005) (demonstrating that the counter-tariff
helps governments exercise restraint in use of the escape clause).
26 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1,
55 (2005) (stating that the escape clause provides necessary flexibility to an
“immutable” treaty commitment).
27 Theory suggests, of course, that sanctions would actually diminish overall
domestic growth. See Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative
Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 78–80 (1998)
(explaining the economic justification for free trade).
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export’ of certain U.S. originated technology, equipment, software
or information for reasons of national security.”28 One of these, the
Atomic Energy Act, prohibits the export of nuclear technology to
nations that have conducted unauthorized testing of nuclear
weapons.29 Similarly, Article 17 of the Foreign Trade Laws of the
People’s Republic of China allows China to “adopt any necessary
measures to safeguard” national security “[w]ith regard to the
import and export of goods and technologies related to fissile and
fusion material or the substances from which such material is
derived.”30 In both cases, the purpose of prohibiting trade in
nuclear technology is to protect national security.
Just as the international trade regime allows for trade sanctions
to protect domestic industry, so too does it allow for protection of
national security.31 The World Trade Organization allows parties
to not make required disclosures of information if such disclosures
threaten national security.32 More pertinently to the evaluation of
sanctions, it also allows parties to deviate from the foundational
requirements of nondiscrimination in order to protect essential
national security.33 The boundaries of “essential” national security
remain somewhat unclear: the few disputes that have arisen
regarding this exception have settled before adjudicators could
hear the disputes and issue rulings.34 The exception does,
28 Sonia Baldia, Intellectual Property in Global Outsourcing: The Art of the
Transfer, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 499, 520 n.64 (2007).
29 See Recent Legislation, Foreign Relations Law—Nuclear Nonproliferation—
Congress Authorizes the President to Waive Restrictions on Nuclear Exports to India,
120 HARV. L. REV. 2020, 2021 (2007) (discussing the United States-India Peaceful
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (USIPAECA) and its impact on the
Atomic Energy Act).
30 Foreign Trade Law, art. 17
(P.R.C.) (2007), translation available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383624.htm.
31 See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security,
40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437, 451–52 (2008) (discussing national security
exceptions in international trade rules).
32 See Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can
Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 283, 290 (2003)
(discussing the national security exception).
33 Id.; Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and
Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 424, 437 (1999) (noting the difficulty of defining “essential” national
security concerns).
34 See Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National
Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 376–77 (2003) (stating
that the few disputes arising in the World Trade Organization have not yielded
rules because the parties settled before adjudication); C. O’Neal Taylor, Impossible
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however, articulate specific items or circumstances that fall within
the term: fissionable materials, military arms or supplies, and
anything during a time of war.35 Thus, the U.S. and Chinese
sanctions would seem to be within the rules of the international
trade regime. While less measured and certainly less settled than
provisions regarding commercial sanctions, the national security
exception similarly creates flexibility in the otherwise inflexible
international trade regime.36
The measurement of success should be much clearer: the
extent to which the sanctioned nations obtain (or do not obtain) the
prohibited technology or good. If, for example, one nation
prohibits the export of encryption technology to another, then
success occurs if that second nation does not obtain the encryption
technology.37 Whether or not the encryption technology obtained
by the sanctioned country actually originated in the sanctioning
country would be of little concern, since the sole concern of the
sanctioning country is to deny access to encryption technology.38
Unlike the evaluation of the successes and costs of sanctions
intended to protect a domestic industry, this evaluation looks
outward, at the effects in another country, rather than inward, at
Cases: Lessons From the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 309, 380 (2007) (noting that parties have avoided determination of the
boundaries of the exception).
35 Kontorovich, supra note 32, at 290.
36 Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the
WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a
New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413, 417
(2001) (“The security exception represents an indispensable escape mechanism or
safety valve without which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade would
cease to exist. Nations are unwilling to participate in such agreements without
the assurance that they have retained the right to protect their sovereignty from
external threat.”). Andrew Guzman argues that concerns about the abuse of a
poorly defined security exception are overblown: “The ability of political
constraints to cabin abusive practices is demonstrated by their effectiveness in
limiting the use of the least disciplined of WTO exceptions: the national security
exception. . . . Simply put, the fact that the exception is not regularly used
indicates that it is simply too costly to invoke when the national security
justification is not plausible.” Andrew T. Guzman, Food Fears: Health and Safety at
the WTO, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 36–37 (2004).
37 See generally Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 319, 330–31 (2005) (discussing the U.S. prohibition on export of encryption
technology to certain countries).
38 See Mai-Trâm B. Dinh, Note, The U.S. Encryption Export Policy: Taking the
Byte Out of the Debate, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 375, 393 (1998) (noting that
criminals circumvent the U.S. sanctions on encryption technology).
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the effects inside the sanctioning country. To use the same tests
and metrics on these two very different types of sanctions would
be meaningless.
2.3. Rule Enforcement
Similar questions are often asked of another closely related
type of sanction: those imposed to enforce an internationallyagreed upon rule. The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES) offers a well-known example.39 The
Convention prohibits the export of ivory from elephants, as part of
an effort to enforce provisions aimed at restoring the numbers of
wild elephants in Africa and Asia.40 In particular, the Convention
authorizes signatories to penalize non-signatories that engage in
trade in elephant ivory.41 This convention is hardly unique; several
international
conventions
regarding
environmental
or
sustainability issues rely on trade sanctions for enforcement.42
The international trade regime itself uses trade sanctions within
its dispute settlement process.43 As Steve Charnovitz notes, “the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
and its annexes do not actually employ the term ‘trade sanction.’”44
Charnovitz goes on to point out that
even without the term “sanction,” that is what the WTO can
impose. . . . [T]he purpose of the WTO-authorized action is
39 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, available at http://www.cites.org
/eng/disc/text.shtml.
40 See Andrew J. Heimert, Note, How the Elephant Lost His Tusks, 104 YALE L.J.
1473, 1478–79 (1995) (discussing international legal measures to protect elephant
populations after CITES).
41 See Mario Del Baglivo, CITES at the Crossroad: New Ivory Sales and Sleeping
Giants, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 289–90 (2003) (discussing the
responsibilities CITES imposes on its signatories with regards to policing illegal
ivory trading).
42 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument
Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 689 (1999) (noting that several
international conventions rely on trade sanctions including CITES, the
Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the International Whaling Convention, and the Straddling Stocks
Agreement).
43 Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The
World Trade Organization’s Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to
AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 353, 361 n.35 (2004).
44 Charnovitz, supra note 24, at 792.
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to induce compliance, and that is properly called a
“sanction.” With the advent of the WTO, the trade policy
community has increasingly employed the term “sanction”
to describe what [the dispute settlement process]
authorizes.45
The law concerning these types of sanctions appears woefully
underdeveloped.46 Obviously, the international trade regime
recognizes the legality of sanctions imposed or authorized by the
international trade regime.47 The trade rules also include a specific
exception for sanctions imposed in compliance with the United
Nations.48 The trade regime does not include any other exceptions.
In theory, this should lead to the application of Article 30 of the
Vienna Convention: if treaties impose conflicting obligations then
signatories are bound to follow the dictates of the later-created
treaty.49 That reading of international law, however, would vitiate
dozens of carefully negotiated enforcement provisions in
international agreements.50 However, “it bears noting that to date
Id. at 793.
Unlike the law of the preceding two types of sanctions—for each of which
a body of rules exists, even though the meaning and application of those rules still
generates argument and scholarly debate—the rules with respect to enforcement
of sanctions appear incomplete.
47 See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law,
92 VA. L. REV. 251, 259 (2006) (“Sanctions are thereby legitimized, while unilateral
counter-retaliation is not. . . . By centralizing the authority to use sanctions, the
WTO system increases enforcement by making threats of sanctions more
credible.”). Of course, the fact that retaliatory sanctions are legal under the trade
regime’s rules does not mean that the sanctions actually contribute to the goals of
the international trade regime; many scholars point out the inherent conflict
between the trading system’s goals and its methods. See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra
note 24, at 792 (arguing that retaliatory trade sanctions “undermine the trading
system”); Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and
Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 620–21 (2000) (suggesting
that trade sanctions do not achieve the trading regime’s goals in some
circumstances); Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights
Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1838 (2002) (“[O]ne of the remedies for
noncompliance—retaliatory sanctions—causes the very trade distortions that the
WTO was designed to avert.”).
48 See Kontorovich, supra note 32, at 290 (describing the exception).
49 Sabrina Safrin, Comment, Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the
World Trade Organization Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 606, 612–13 (2002).
50 See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
Debate, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 498 (1994) (discussing the “fruitful interplay
between unilateral and multilateral action” in such international agreements, and
45
46
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not a single multilateral environmental agreement or government
action taken to implement such an agreement has been found to
violate the WTO Agreements.”51
Clearly, the international
community has not yet sufficiently sorted out the law regarding
sanctions intended to enforce agreed-upon rules.
The metric of “success” with respect to these types of sanctions
should be no different than that of any other measure designed to
compel compliance with a rule: the extent to which those from
whom compliance is expected do in fact comply. Mario Del
Baglivo, for example, suggests that “[m]ost observers credit the
CITES Ivory Ban with virtually ending the poaching crisis
throughout Africa.”52 If this is true, then the sanctioning of trade in
ivory may be “successful.”
2.4. Expression of Preferences
A fourth set of reasons for trade sanctions could reflect
collective attitudes and preferences.53 Massachusetts’s sanctions on
Burma, for example, hardly spring from a protectionist impulse—
rather, those sanctions could reflect a collective distaste for the
political regime in Burma.54 Similarly, it is quite possible that the
majority of people in the United States could feel so much

citing the potential dangers in overriding it); A. Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty
Versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The Dilemma of Latin American
Rainforest Management, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 37, 63 (1997) (discussing how developed
countries can make unilateral use of export bans on unsustainable timber
products but will have much more difficulty with import bans).
51 Safrin, supra note 49, at 623–24 (pointing to several “formidable
multilateral environmental agreements” that predate the international trade
regime but have not been questioned by that regime).
52 Del Baglivo, supra note 41, at 293.
53 See Karl E. Case, Musgrave’s Vision of the Public Sector: The Complex
Relationship Between Individual, Society and State in Public Good Theory, 32 J. ECON. &
FIN. 348, 353–54 (2008) (explaining theories of collective attitudes and noting the
role of law in expressing these attitudes).
54 See Lucien Dhooge, The Wrong Way to Mandalay: The Massachusetts Selective
Purchasing Act and the Constitution, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 387, 410 n.168 (2000) (noting
that the Massachusetts legislature felt that Massachusetts had a moral duty not to
deal with Burma, and quoting State Senator Marian Walsh as “urg[ing] her
colleagues to ‘recognize the responsibility we have to set a tone for civil rights
across the globe.’”).
The United States Supreme Court struck down
Massachusetts’s sanctions on the narrow grounds that existing federal laws
sanctioning Burma preempted the action by the state. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreing
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000); see also The Supreme Court: 1999 Term—
Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 349, 353–55 (2000) (discussing the case).
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revulsion at the atrocities committed in Darfur by the Sudanese
government that they simply would not want entities within their
jurisdiction to interact with that government.55
Markets, and by extension David Ricardo’s economic theory
justifying international trade,56 encourage the expression of
preferences57 and it therefore would be somewhat distortive to not
allow such expressions.58 The international trade regime, however,
does not accommodate these types of sanctions. Unlike the
flexibility displayed with respect to domestic industries and
national security, the trade regime displays little flexibility with
respect to local expression of preferences.59
Notwithstanding the rules against these types of sanctions,
they continue to be imposed. Unlike each of the other types of
sanctions described in this Section, no outcome generated by these
types of sanctions indicates success or failure. The sanction does
not attempt to achieve a particular outcome. Rather, the sanction
reflects an internal aspect of the collective, an internal preference

55 See International Crisis Group, Poll Shows Americans Support U.S. Role in
Darfur,
June
1,
2005,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm
?l=1&id=3492&m=1 (reporting results of a survey that indicate that most people
in the United States morally oppose the actions of the Sudanese government in
Darfur).
56 See Tomer Broude, Taking “Trade and Culture” Seriously: Geographic
Indications and Cultural Protection in WTO Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 657
n.104 (2005) (noting David Ricardo’s “famed exposition of the principle of
comparative advantage”).
57 Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics and Race-Based
Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1192 (1998) (“Markets allow an
almost-democratic expression of preferences, including the preferences of
society’s worst-off. Just as importantly, markets will punish policy-makers who
ignore them.”). Indeed, an Edgeworth-Bowley box—used to measure the
allocation of resources when people trade—explicitly takes preferences into
account as one of its axes. See Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for
the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577, 604–08 (1987) (explaining the EdgeworthBowley box’s representativeness of the relationship between individual
preferences and social efficiency).
58 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW.
U. L. REV. 4, 4 (1994) (“The two most important institutions in our system,
democracy and the market, make individual preference decisive in the formation
of policy and the allocation of resources. Without acknowledgment of preference,
democracy and the market as we know them could not exist.”).
59 See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 659
(1996) (“[T]he rigidity of this new dispute settlement system may have a darker
aspect: it may become so inflexible as to actually hinder the prospects for free
trade.”).
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given voice through operation of law.60 The critical measurement,
therefore, also looks at the processes inside the collective and asks
whether the sanction does in fact legitimately and accurately reflect
the preferences of the individuals that compromise that collective.61
2.5. Sanctions That Seek to Change Behavior
Each of the types of sanctions discussed so far has a different
purpose; axiomatically, the success of each would be measured in
different ways, and the costs and benefits of each would constitute
very different discussions. To simply evaluate trade sanctions writ
large would more often than not constitute a meaningless exercise.
A fifth type of trade sanction is equally unique, in which the goal is
to change the behavior of an individual actor.62
These sanctions differ from those intended to enforce an
internationally-agreed upon rule in at least two important ways.63
Such sanctions tend to be unilateral, or imposed by a small group
of nations.64 Moreover, these sanctions are intended to force a
broad change in the behavior of target countries rather than

60 See, e.g., Alejandra Carvajal, State and Local “Free Burma” Laws: The Case for
Sub-National Trade Sanctions, 29 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 257, 268 (1998) (“The
Massachusetts law is very straightforward in that sense: Massachusetts morally
opposes the Burmese regime and therefore will do no business with the regime or
its business partners.”).
61 See Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Joyce L. Tong, Diversity or Cacophony? The
Continuing Debate Over New Sources of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1349,
1373 (2004) (“If a country can demonstrate the truly democratic character of
domestic choices including some degree of inclusiveness of non-domestic
constituencies than [sic] these choices must trump requirements of legal
consistency.”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International
Organizations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 398, 411 (1996) (“The general public interest
of the citizens cannot even be known by governments without enabling their
citizens to freely express their individual preferences in transparent, democratic
decision-making processes and open markets.”) (emphasis omitted). Nicolaïdis
and Tong suggest that “we must applaud when the WTO Appellate Body tells a
country how to come to a decision rather than what decisions it is allowed to
make.” Nicolaïdis & Tong, supra, at 1373.
62 See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE
HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME 12 (1988) (identifying changing behavior of target
countries as a purpose of some sanctions).
63 See supra notes 39–52 and accompanying text (describing sanctions
intended to enforce agreed upon rules).
64 See Roger Normand & Christoph Wilcke, Human Rights, Sanctions, and
Terrorist Threats: The United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq, 11 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 319 (2001) (“[H]istorically only powerful nations have
applied sanctions to force weaker nations to change.”).
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compliance with a single rule or regime.65 The statements of a U.S.
legislator supporting unilateral sanctions of this type illustrate the
breadth of changes sought:
The purpose of sanctions is to change behavior. The
changes we seek, in partnership with the Burmese people,
are these: concrete, irreversible steps toward reconciliation
and democratization that include the full, unfettered
participation of the National League for Democracy and
ethnic minorities; ending attacks on ethnic minorities; and
the immediate, unconditional release of all prisoners of
conscience, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San
Suu Kyi. The regime also needs to know that a sham
Constitutional process and token prisoner releases will not
be regarded by anyone as progress toward these goals.66
The United States’ sanctions on Cuba are a paradigmatic
example of this type of sanction.67 The sanctions explicitly embrace
the purpose of effectuating change in Cuba.
The Cuban
Democracy Act, the first of the two acts dealing with sanctions on
Cuba, flatly states, “It should be the policy of the United States . . .
to seek a peaceful transition to democracy and a resumption of
economic growth in Cuba through the careful application of
sanctions directed at the Castro government and support for the
Cuban people.”68
The later-enacted Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act amplifies these goals and introduces the idea that
65 See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, Condemning Khartoum: The Illinois Divestment Act
and Foreign Relations, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 245, 297 (2006) (“[T]he intent of the Illinois
Act is to establish an economic boycott of a single identified country for the
purpose of encouraging it to change its policies with respect to its governance of a
single province within its national borders.”); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 677, 699
(2000) (“‘The purpose of our sanctions, however, is to spur changes in policy.’”)
(quoting U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks Before the
American-Iranian Council (Mar. 17, 2000), available at http://secretary.state.gov
/www/statements/2000/000317.html).
66 Press Release, Senator Mitch McConnell, McConnell, Feinstein Call for
Renewed Sanctions against Burmese Junta (June 14, 2007), available at
http://mcconnell.senate.gov/print_record.cfm?id=276921
(quoting
Senator
McConnell).
67 The U.S. sanctions on Cuba are thoroughly described in Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 419 (1996).
68 Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6002.
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Cuba should conduct itself similarly to other countries in the
region, stating, “The purposes of this Act are . . . to assist the
Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as
in joining the community of democratic countries that are
flourishing in the Western Hemisphere.”69 The U.S. sanctions on
Cuba, therefore, are intended as an application of economic force
that will cause Cuba to align its behaviors with principles such as
democracy in manners similar to the behaviors of neighboring
countries.
The legal structure governing such sanctions is confused, to the
extent that it exists.70 A substantial amount of law governs the use
of physical force to effectuate broad changes,71 but the same is not
true of trade sanctions. As Michael Malloy points out:
The general impermissibility of the use or threat of armed
force has to some degree increased the relative importance
of economic sanctions, a form of economic warfare. This is
not necessarily a fortuitous development. The less obvious
costs of economic sanctions, as compared to those of armed
force, may encourage a facile resort to economic sanctions
that would have been intolerable in the case of armed
force.72
Developing a means of thinking about the successes, and costs,
of these types of sanctions is the purpose of this Article. To do so,
closer attention will be paid to the U.S. sanctions on Cuba. The
context for those sanctions begins several centuries in the past.

69

§ 6022.

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C.

70 Ironically, the indiscriminate infliction of injury on civilians for purposes of
eroding their support of an existing regime or to incite those civilians to demand
political change falls within many definitions of terrorism, and is soundly
rebuked by most international bodies. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1566, at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (defining and condemning terrorism).
71 See Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information
Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1033–38 (2007) (describing laws of war);
Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in
Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 39 (2000) (describing limits on the use of force against
civilians); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J., 1, 3 (2002) (“All nations around the
world agree on some concept of civilian inviolability.”).
72 Michael P. Malloy, Où Est Votre Chapeau? Economic Sanctions and Trade
Regulation, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371, 371–72 (2003) (citation omitted).
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CUBA

Humans have occupied the Cuban island for approximately
4,500 years.73 In around 300 A.D., the Taíno tribe arrived in Cuba,
supplanting those tribes that already lived on the island.74 When
Cristóbal Colón arrived from Spain in 1492, the Taíno greeted him
to the island, which he subsequently claimed for Spain.75
For the next four hundred years Spain administered Cuba as a
colony.76 By 1548, only about five hundred Taíno survived (from a
population estimated at around one million when Colón arrived).77
African slaves arrived in the 1550s, and slavery persisted until
1886.78 Slavery brought hundreds of thousands of persons to
Cuba. By 1846, thirty-six percent of the population was enslaved
and freed descendents of slaves constituted another seventeen
percent—together more than half of the population of Cuba.79
Slaves had limited rights, and people of color faced numerous
restrictions on personal and commercial activities.80

73 JOSE M. GUARCH DELMONTE,
DEL TAÍNO DE CUBA 14 (1973).

ENSAYO

DE RECONSTRUCCIÓN ETNO-HISTÓRICA

74 See FRANCINE JACOBS, THE TAINOS: THE PEOPLE WHO WELCOMED COLUMBUS
18–19 (1992) (describing the genesis of Taino society in Cuba).
75 Elizabeth de Lima-Dantas, Historical Setting, in CUBA, A COUNTRY STUDY 1,
6–7 (James D. Randolph ed., 1987); see also DeAnna Marie Rivera, Note, Taino
Sacred Sites: An International Comparative Analysis for a Domestic Solution, 20 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 443, 446 (2003) (describing the meeting of Colón and the Taíno).
76 See RICHARD GOTT, CUBA: A NEW HISTORY (2005); CLIFFORD L. STATEN, THE
HISTORY OF CUBA (2003) (discussing the history of Spanish occupation of Cuba).
77 JACOBS, supra note 74, at 58, 91. In the mid-1500s a Taíno chief named
Guamá and his wife Habaguanex led a guerrilla war against the Spaniards, but
the Spaniards won and essentially annihilated the Taíno peoples.
78 See Alejandro de la Fuente, Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba: The
Tannenbaum Debate Revisited, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 339, 353–68 (2004) (discussing
the history of slavery in Cuba); see generally LAIRD W. BERGAD, THE COMPARATIVE
HISTORIES OF SLAVERY IN BRAZIL, CUBA, AND THE UNITED STATES (2007).
79 Ada Ferrer, Cuba, 1898: Rethinking Race, Nation, and Empire, 73 RADICAL
HIST. REV. 22, 23 (1999). More slaves were forced into Cuba than were forced into
the entirety of the United States. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow:
Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 11, 26 (2001) (reporting that Cuba absorbed nearly 140% of the number of
Africans forced into the United States between 1790 and 1867). See also Jenny S.
Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 117
YALE L.J. 550, 602–10 (2008) (discussing the slave trade into Cuba).
80 Ferrer, supra note 79, at 23; de la Fuente, supra note 78, at 356 (outlining the
rights and restrictions of people of color).
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Spain perceived Cuba’s role within its empire as a producer of
tobacco, and later, sugar.81 Spain jealously guarded this trade, in
part through the operation of trading monopolies and in part
through severe restriction on the ability of persons in Cuba to trade
outside of Cuba. The monopolies operated until the early 1800s, at
which time the Creole population82 was given limited rights to
trade, along with limited representation in Spain in accordance
with the Spanish Constitution of 1812 (a weak constitution that
was later revoked).83
Even after some loosening of trade
restrictions, native-born Cubans generally did not exert substantial
political control over the island.
The relationship between Cuba and the United States was
somewhat complicated.84 As other former colonies achieved
independence, the United States warned European nations away
from interfering, asserting that these new nations fell within the
United States’ sphere of influence.85 With specific reference to
Cuba, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams wrote that the islands
of Cuba and Puerto Rico are “natural appendages to the North
American continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our
shores . . . has become an object of transcendent importance to the

81 See de Lima-Dantas, supra note 75, at 10 (describing Cuba’s economic role
in Spain’s empire).
82 “Creole” referred to persons of Spanish ancestry born on the island of
Cuba. K. Scott Kohanowski, Book Annotations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 829, 837
(2000).
83 Christina Burnett points out that the Creole representatives from various
colonies were outnumbered by the Peninsulares from Spain and thus could not
give full effect to their needs. Christina Duffy Burnett, “They say I am not an
American . . .”: The Noncitizen National and the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J.
INT’L L. 659, 684 (2008).
84 See William O. Walker III, Cuba and the Roots of U.S. Foreign Relations, 20
DIPLOMATIC HIST. 125, 125 (1996) (suggesting that it is impossible to understand
the history and development of U.S. foreign policy without studying the United
States’ relationship with Cuba).
85 This policy, created largely by Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and
James Monroe, is known as the Monroe Doctrine. See Michael Wallace Gordon,
Thinking About Cuba: Post-Castro Cuba Began a Decade Ago, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 311,
313 (2003) (discussing the United States’ rejection of European influence in the
Western hemisphere and its interest in the annexation of Cuba); Jeffrey J.
Malanson, The Congressional Debate over U.S. Participation in the Congress of Panama,
1825–1826: Washington’s Farewell Address, Monroe’s Doctrine, and the Fundamental
Principles of U.S. Foreign Policy, 30 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 813, 816–17 (2006) (discussing
the basic principles of the Monroe Doctrine).
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political and commercial interests of our Union. . . . There are laws
of political as well as physical gravitation . . . .”86
When Mexico and Venezuela moved to support Cuban efforts
to achieve independence, however, subsequent Secretary of State
Henry Clay quietly let them know that the United States would
thwart any effort to pry Cuba free from Spain because of concerns
that a slave-free Cuba would affect the institution of slavery in the
southern United States.87
In 1834 Spain appointed General Miguel Tacón as its CaptainGeneral of Cuba, with dictatorial powers. Tacón’s rule marked the
beginning of a sixty year period marked by repression, revocation
of civil rights, and denial of representation. Nonetheless, during
this period Cubans organized themselves, both within Cuba and in
exile communities, in struggles for independence. During this
period the United States also made several overtures to Spain to
purchase the island.
In 1868 Carlos Manuel de Céspedes proclaimed the
independence of Cuba in the Grito de Yara. War broke out shortly
thereafter. De Céspedes and other leaders of the revolution were
men of wealth who fought for the rights of hacienda owners,
whereas the ranks of their armies were filled with the poor, who
fought largely for the end of slavery and a change in the way of life
in Cuba. As the historian Philip Foner points out: “Inevitably, a
conflict emerged between these two types of objectives.”88 For the
next couple of decades independence fighters and the Spanish
fought deadly but inconclusive battles. Throughout this period the
United States remained neutral.
The end of U.S. neutrality brought an end to hostilities, and to
Spanish rule of Cuba. The Spanish-American war, fought on many
seas and for many reasons, concluded with a new master for Cuba
in the form of the U.S. military or provisional governors. Although
the Cuban Liberation Army fought alongside the United States
forces in the war against Spain, and although Spain formally ceded

86 See Merze Tate, The Australasian Monroe Doctrine, 76 POL. SCI. Q. 264, 270
(1961) (citing Letter from John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State to Hugh Nelson,
U.S. Minister to Spain, (Apr. 28, 1823), 32 Congress, 1 session, 121, at 6–7).
87 See GILLIAN GUNN, CUBA IN TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 4 (1993)
(describing the U.S. reaction to Cuba’s bid for independence).
88 PHILIP S. FONER, A HISTORY OF CUBA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED
STATES Vol. II 1845–1895, at 189 (1963).
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control to the Cuban assembly, the United States governed Cuba
for almost a decade.
The end of U.S. rule brought little clarity to the governance of
Cuba, nor did it necessarily result in the fruition of the visions of
the common people who had fought for independence from Spain.
The outgoing American Governor strongly favored election of the
first President, who in turn was despised and driven out of office
by opposition parties. Cuba experienced a steady turnover of
governments over the next fifty years, ending with the seizure of
power in 1952 by Fulgencio Batista, who had already served one
term as President. “Between 1902 and 1959 Cuba floundered
politically, since it had no experience with democracy. . . . [T]he
political turmoil was at times severe . . . .”89
The United States’ relationship with Cuba during this period
was not entirely benign. The United States exercised military
control over Cuba twice more. Far more insidious was the
introduction of organized crime. Criminal organizations from the
United States fostered connections with Cuba “beginning with the
export of illegal liquor to the United States during prohibition and
expanding into prostitution, gambling, and drugs.”90 Batista
assiduously cultivated relationships with organized crime from the
United States, turning Havana into a “Latin Las Vegas.”91
Legitimate businesses also invested in Cuba. By the 1950s, the
United States accounted for more than half of all Cuban exports
and imports, and a majority of foreign investment as well.
Nonetheless, although “the Cuban economy experienced
tremendous growth during this period . . . the benefits derived
from this economic growth were not equally distributed among the
island’s population, thus creating the perfect arena for the ‘Castro
Revolution’ in 1959.”92 Remarks attributed to President Kennedy
summarize the United State’s relationship with Cuba:
89 Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as’ Race and
Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69, 86 (1998).
90 Joseph C. Sweeney, Guantanamo and U.S. Law, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 673,
688 (2007).
91 Luz Estella Nagle, The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin
America, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1649, 1659–60 (2003); see also ETHAN A.
NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT 272 (1993) (“In return for cash payments to the Cuban dictator,
the American criminals were provided with lucrative casino concessions as well
as substantial freedom in the conduct of their other criminal activities.”).
92 Sandrino-Glasser, supra note 89, at 86–7.
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I believe there is no country in the world, including all of
the African regions . . . where economic colonization,
humiliation and exploitation were worse than Cuba, in part
owing to my country’s policies during the Batista
regime. . . . I will go even further: to some extent it is as
though Batista was the incarnation of a number of sins on
the part of the United States.93
On January 1, 1959, Cuban revolutionaries lead by Che
Guevara and Fidel Castro seized control of Cuba. Over the next
three years the Cuban government nationalized most foreign
investment, including the hotels, casinos, oil refineries, nickel
mines, and sugar processing plants that had been controlled by
U.S. entities. In 1960 President Eisenhower imposed the first
economic embargo on Cuba, which retaliated by severing ties with
the United States.94 Cuba proclaimed itself communist shortly
thereafter and strengthened ties with the Soviet Union.95
The period since the revolution has been one of Cuba’s most
stable in the last century and a half. That stability has not,
however, been marked by political openness and democracy. To
the contrary, Cuba represses political dissent, severely limits the
press, and monitors activities of its citizens.96
To summarize the Cuban experience, Cuba’s history essentially
begins with the Spanish occupation of the island, and most of its
history is a history of foreign domination. Cubans have very little
experience with democracy, or with economic opportunity.97
93 MARK FALCOFF, CUBA THE MORNING AFTER: CONFRONTING CASTRO’S LEGACY
8 (2003).
94 See David Mowry, Lifting the Embargo Against Cuba Using Vietnam as a
Model: A Policy Paper for Modernity, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 229, 235–36 (1999)
(describing the first economic embargo against Cuba).
95 Id. at 236 (“Cuba would have almost surely met with economic and social
ruin if the former Soviet Union had not provided billions in annual aid.”).
96 See
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
COUNTRY
REPORT:
CUBA
(2008),
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2008&country
=7378 (describing the limits imposed upon Cuban citizens by its government).
97 See THOMAS D. BOSWELL & JAMES R. CURTIS, THE CUBAN-AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE: CULTURE, IMAGES, AND PERSPECTIVES 16 (1984) (“The long period of
Spanish domination played a major role in forming Cuban culture. The language,
religion, economic institutions, and social structure of Spain were transferred to
the island. Spanish law and policy kept the government highly centralized and,
along with trade, in the hands of Spaniards. Virtually no industry developed.
Sugar and, to a lesser extent, tobacco became the major cash crops. Society was
highly stratified, with relatively few rich families and a large mass of poor people,
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Cuba’s relationship with the United States has not necessarily been
beneficial for most Cubans. Cubans today do not always have
unfettered access to information from outside Cuba. And Cuba
suffers drastic sanctions intended to change the behavior of the
Cuban government.98
4.

UNDERSTANDING CHANGE

The sanctions attempt to effectuate a change in behavior. A
great number of schools of social sciences agree that institutions
shape behavior.99 The word “institution” is used to describe a
variety of social artifacts;100 this Article uses the word in the same
manner as do institutional economists such as Douglass North,101
development theorists such as Barbara Thomas-Slayter,102 or

many of whom lived as peasants in a predominantly rural environment. In short,
it was not a life of equal opportunities for all individuals.”).
98 See JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC
RELATIONS 360 (5th ed. 1996) (“Exaggerated views of the Cuban revolution’s threat
to U.S. business and political interests, suspicions that Castro was a Communist,
and Castro’s declarations that he would not tolerate manipulation of Cuba by the
U.S. government led to open U.S. hostility toward Cuba, a break in diplomatic
relations between the two countries, and a U.S. policy of welcoming refugees from
Cuba’s ‘Communist oppression’ to the ‘free world.’”).
99 See, e.g., John Groenewegen, Frans Kerstholt & Ad Nagelkerke, On
Integrating New and Old Institutionalism: Douglass North Building Bridges, 29 J. ECON.
ISSUES 467, 467 (1995) (“Definitions of institution refer to a framework of behavior:
institutions direct, channel, or guide behavior.”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew
S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 372 (1998)
(describing institutionalism in international relations theory).
100 Joel Trachtman, an institutional economist, understands that use of the
term “institution” can encompass formal organizations and rules as well as
informal, non-legal organizations. Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the
Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional
Analysis, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 470, 473 n.18 (1997). In legal scholarship, the
word “institution” often refers simply to a large organization. See, e.g., Jacob E.
Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543,
588 (2007) (discussing the structuring of political institutions).
101 See Groenewegen, Kerstholt & Nagelkerke, supra note 99, at 471–72
(discussing North and his work).
102 See Barbara P. Thomas-Slayter, Structural Change, Power Politics, and
Community Organizations in Africa: Challenging the Patterns, Puzzles and Paradoxes,
22 WORLD DEV. 1479, 1480 (1994) (“Institutions are the core of our social systems,
determining how people interact with one another, and constituting the rules by
which people conduct their lives.”).
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sociologists such as Paul DiMaggio.103 In trying to synthesize the
subtleties of the different flavors of these schools of thought, David
Dequech states that “one may broadly define institutions as socially
shared patterns of behavior and/or thought.”104 These “previously
established sets of guidelines within which a given group of people
relate to one another . . . form the patterned expectations of
behavior for members of that group.”105 Thus, institutions include
both the interoperative platform that makes human interaction
possible106 and “the rules of the games” played upon that
platform.107 Institutions allow people to create and enforce
relationships.
103 See Klaus Nielsen, Institutionalist Approaches in the Social Sciences: Typology,
Dialogue, and Future Challenges, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 505, 507–08 (2001) (discussing
DiMaggio’s use of the term “institutionalism”).
104 David Dequech, Institutions and Norms in Institutional Economics and
Sociology, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 473, 473 (2006). Others, not seeking to synthesize
schools of thought, agree with this definition. See, e.g., Paul D. Bush, The Theory of
Institutional Change, in 1 EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS: FOUNDATIONS OF
INSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 125, 126 (Marc J. Tool ed., 1988) (“[A]n ‘institution’ may
be defined as a set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behavior.”);
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Cause and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)
(“[R]egimes are defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area.”).
105 Thomas-Slayter, supra note 102, at 1480.
106 See Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Economy, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY 27, 37 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994) (defining
institutions “as cognitive formations (categories, typifications, scripts) entailing
constitutive understandings upon which action is predicated”). As simple
examples, social artifacts such as alphabets, language, salutations—all of which
exist as shared understandings and expectations—constitute institutions.
107 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3–4 (1990) (“Institutions include any form of constraint
that human beings devise to shape human interaction. . . . Institutional constraints
include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under
what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities.”);
see also Yngve Ramstad, “Reasonable Value” Versus “Instrumental Value:” Competing
Paradigms in Institutional Economics, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 761, 763 (1989) (describing
institutions as “the ‘rule structure’ within which individuals must confine their
activity subject to sanctions”). Some scholars found tension between the two
types of definitions. Pavel Pelikan suggests that “[t]he roots of this difference are
in the old conceptual dilemma encountered by several economists who have
searched for an operationally clear definition of institutions, which can roughly be
stated as follows: should institutions be defined as constraints, comparable to ‘the
rules of a game,’ or as routines, meaning ‘specific ways of playing a game’?”
Pavel Pelikan, Bringing Institutions Into Evolutionary Economics: Another View with
Links to Changes in Physical and Social Technologies, 13 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 237,
238 (2003).
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Law is an institution. Law inarguably acts as a shared set of
expectations that allow persons to form and enforce
relationships.108 Contract law, in particular, enables the creation of
predictable and enforceable relationships and establishes rules of
the game for a variety of privately created relationships.109
Understanding law as an institution has more than a theoretical
effect. Ann and Robert Seidman describe a legislative drafting
project in the People’s Republic of China. The drafters sought to
effect real social change through law, and in order to do so they
sought a theoretical framework that could guide them in drafting
laws.110 Prevalent theories of law, such as pluralism and public
choice theory, offer only descriptions.111 The Seidmans describe
how theory failed the drafters of law:
Substantively, drafters had to devise legislative programs
to resolve perceived social problems. To do that without a
theory to guide the search for solutions, drafters
everywhere too often ran around like rats in a maze,
looking for an exit by butting their heads at random spots
in the wall. Frequently, almost as if law served as a magic
charm, their bills merely defined desired future states of
affairs in normative terms, leaving the administrators to
figure out how to get there. When the administrators
failed, the drafters simply imposed increasingly draconian
criminal penalties.112

108 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus
for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 339–40 (1989) (emphasizing that
law is an institution); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 449, 476 (1992) (stating that law is an institution); Thomas-Slayter, supra
note 102, at 1480 (“Thus, legal codes, land tenure systems, or marital
arrangements can all be regarded as institutions.”).
109 See Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming
Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT.
L. REV. 839, 869 (1999) (“[C]ontract law, like other institutions of society,
provide[s] an ethical corrective not central to the individualism of liberal political
theory. It is through institutions that society ethically orders itself.”); Janet T.
Landa, Bounded Rationality of Homo Classificus: The Law and Bioeconomics of Social
Norms as Classification, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1167, 1174 (2005) (“Contract law is an
example of a formal institution . . . .”).
110 Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Drafting Legislation for Development:
Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 19 (1996).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 22.
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Recognizing law as an institution and understanding the role
that institutions serve in facilitating relationships led to a
framework that provided meaningful guidance to these drafters of
laws:
That theory rested on an institutionalist hypothesis:
Institutions constitute society’s building blocks; law
constitutes government’s chief instrument for creating and
changing institutions. The Project’s legislative theory
therefore had to guide drafters in using law as an
instrument for changing the repetitive patterns of social
behaviours that comprised existing dysfunctional
institutions.113
Seidman and Seidman note that understanding the necessity of
institutions to facilitate interaction is particularly important when
attempting to inform new behaviors in emerging economies.114
They also point out that “[n]o market operates in vacuo.”115
Commercial activity consists of relationships, of human
interaction.116 Therefore, “[e]ach [market] operates in the context
of myriad institutions—governmental, private and in between.
That is to say, knowledge of how those institutions work must lie
at the very core of economic analysis and economic and legal
policy-making.”117
4.1. How Institutions Change
The United States specifically states as a goal of its sanctions on
Cuba a desire to bring Cuba’s behavior in line with that of other

113 Id. Other legal scholars have pointed out the practical applications that
accrue from understanding the role of institutions. Roderick Hills, for example,
suggests that antidiscrimination laws signal to society which forums are
appropriate for resolving “controversies about the propriety of stigma.” Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the Transformation of
Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1615–16 (1997).
114 Seidman & Seidman, supra note 110, at 33.
115 Id.
116 See Joseph P. Cannon & William D. Perreault, Jr., Buyer-Seller Relationships
in Business Markets, 36 J. MARKETING RES. 439, 440–44 (1999) (describing various
theories and indicators of relationships in business, including legal bonds such as
contracts).
117 Seidman & Seidman, supra note 110, at 33.
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democratic nations in the region.118 In general, these types of trade
sanctions seek to align behaviors. Institutional theory suggests
that alignment of behavior requires an alignment of institutions.
The “success” of these sanctions, therefore, depends largely on the
extent to which institutions in the offending country change and
function more like those in complying countries. Sociologists
describe the process whereby institutions change to resemble one
another as a process of isomorphism.119
Sociologists discuss three broad categories of factors that bring
institutions into alignment with one another: normative
isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and coercive isomorphism.120
These processes need not be exclusive, but identifying each
contributes to the rigor with which convergence in institutions can
be analyzed.
4.1.1.

Normative Isomorphism

Normative isomorphism describes the convergence of
institutions that occurs under circumstances such as
professionalization of a service or practice.121 Mark Mizruchi and
Lisa Fein describe “normative isomorphism as a result of
professionalization, involving two processes. First, members of
professions receive similar training (such as that received by
physicians, attorneys, and university professors), which socializes
them into similar worldviews. Second, members of professions
interact through professional and trade associations, which further

118

Cuba).

See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions on

119 See Christopher Marquis, Mary Ann Glynn & Gerald F. Davis, Community
as Isomorphism and Corporate Social Action, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 925, 926 (2007)
(describing isomorphism as “the resemblance of a focal corporation’s social
practices to those of other corporations within its geographic community”).
120 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM.
SOC. REV. 147, 150–53 (1983) (describing engines of isomorphic change); Mark S.
Mizruchi & Lisa C. Fein, The Social Construction of Organizational Knowledge: A
Study of the Uses of Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative Isomorphism, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
653, 653 (1999) (acknowledging and applying the DiMaggio & Powell analysis).
121 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking
in Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 101 n.108 (2008) (“The
professionalization of a field often yields what has been termed ‘normative
isomorphism,’ the standardizing effect that professional training, education, and
networks exert on organizational behavior.”).
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Professionalization is
diffuses ideas among them.”122
representative rather than exhaustive of the means by which
normative isomorphism may occur. Whenever the people who
influence the design and use of institutions learn to think in similar
ways and share formational experiences, one can predict some
degree of convergence in the structure of institutions.123
Although jurisprudential scholars generally use neither the
analytics nor the language of sociologists, the process of normative
isomorphism probably accounts for a great deal of law. With
respect to trade, Robert Hudec describes the importance of the
regular “seminars” held between U.S. and British economists and
policymakers in laying a foundation for what would later become
the international trade regime.124 Joseph Coppock, who helped to
create the international regime, speaks of the collaboration in terms
that fit within the process of normative isomorphism:
I might say here that all of us working in this international
economic realm had a very clear conception of what we
were about. And this derived from our living through the
thirties, our study of the experience of the twenties and the
thirties, as well as from our professional training. One thing
that was embodied in the Lend-Lease Act of March ‘41, that
there not be a big carryover, big holdover of international
debts because of the bad experience after World War I, was
very important. So the negotiations out of the lend-lease
obligations at the end of the war was an aspect of that.125
The process described by Coppock has accelerated over time.
Through a variety of mechanisms, some of which could be

Mizruchi & Fein, supra note 120, at 657.
See Robert Dingwall & Kerry Kidd, After the Fall . . . : Capitulating to the
Routine in Professional Work, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 67, 73 (2003) (“The spread of
higher education and credentialing has led to increasing homogeneity among
those who form the elite cadres of organizations. These common experiences,
together with the networks created by subsequent training, specialty associations,
participation in public service bodies, and the like, encourage organizational
leaders to think and act in similar ways.”).
124 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY 5–12 (2d ed. 1990) (describing economic cooperation between Great
Britain and the United States).
125 Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, Oral History Interview with Joseph
D. Coppock by Richard D. McKinzie, at 49 (1974), available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/coppockj.htm.
122
123

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/2

2009]

ISOMORPHISM & REGIME CHANGE

779

described as normative, the international commercial regime is
undergoing a transformation that could metaphorically be
described as professionalization. As Pistor notes, “[t]he vehicle for
building the legal architecture for global markets is the
harmonization of law around the globe by way of developing legal
standards.”126
4.1.2.

Mimetic Isomorphism

Mimetic isomorphism describes a convergence of institutions
due to copying or imitation.127 Entities sometimes turn to imitation
during conditions of uncertainty.128 Because they cannot turn to
experiences of their own for direction, they adopt a strategy of
mimicking the choices that others have made.129 Interestingly,
actors seem to feel that they can enhance the legitimacy of new
institutions by replicating existing institutions.130
The sources for mimicry vary.131 Perceived “success” of extant
institutions can lead to imitation.132 For the purposes of this
Article, however, the most interesting factor contributing to
imitation is repeated and frequent interaction.133 Trade sanctions,
by their nature, limit interaction.
126 Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 97 (2002).
127 See Elizabeth H. Gorman, Explaining the Spread of Law Firm In-House
Counsel Positions: A Response to Professor Chambliss, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1577, 1583
(2006) (describing mimetic isomorphism).
128 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the
Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1615, 1641 (2004) (discussing mimetic isomorphism of professional
networks responding to ambiguous legal requirements).
129 Brad Tuttle & Jesse Dillard, Beyond Competition: Institutional Isomorphism in
U.S. Accounting Research, 21 ACCT. HORIZONS 387, 392–93 (2007).
130 See Ilídio Barreto & Charles Baden-Fuller, To Conform or To Perform?
Mimetic Behaviour, Legitimacy-Based Groups and Performance Consequences, 43 J.
MGMT. STUD. 1559, 1561 (2006) (describing attempts of organizations to legitimize
new institutions through mimetic isomorphism).
131 See Martin Lodge & Kai Wegrich, Control Over Government: Institutional
Isomorphism and Governance Dynamics in German Public Administration, 33 POL’Y
STUD. J. 213, 217 (2005) (“Mimicry draws on a variety of sources . . . .”).
132 See D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter
Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.KENT L. REV. 231, 280 (2008) (“Those organizations mimicked are ones viewed as
more successful or legitimate.”).
133 See Pamela R. Haunschild & Anne S. Miner, Modes of Interorganizational
Imitation: The Effects of Outcome Salience and Uncertainty, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 472,
474–75 (1997) (discussing frequency-based imitation); Sokol, supra note 132, at 281
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Empirical research indicates that imitation of successful
institutions can actually lead to success for the imitator. In a study
of business organizations in emerging economies, for example,
Lance Eliot Brouthers, Edward O’Donnell and John Hadjimarcou
found that firms that had relationships with companies in Europe,
Japan and the United States and that imitated strategies of those
companies performed better than companies within their countries
that did not (or could not) imitate those strategies.134 In a wider
context, mimetic isomorphism observably contributes to the
dissemination of best business practices.135
Law is replete with incidents of mimetic isomorphism.
Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan suggest, for example,
that mimetic isomorphism may account for the convergences that
they observe in the rules created by corporate privacy officers.136
Daniel Sokol suggests that competition (antitrust) law has
converged globally as nations have imitated competition
provisions found in trade agreements with the United States or
Europe.137 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks state that laws dealing
with issues as varied as the environment, education, and war have
converged through the process of imitation.138 Imitation influences
law.
4.1.3.

Coercive Isomorphism

Coercive isomorphism describes convergence in institutions as
a response to incentives.139 Incentives may be positive (something

(describing mimetic isomorphism “based on repeat iterations” in the context of
antitrust compliance).
134 Lance Eliot Brouthers, Edward O’Donnell & John Hadjimarcou, Generic
Product Strategies for Emerging Market Exports into Triad Nation Markets: A Mimetic
Isomorphism Approach, 42 J. MGMT. STUD. 225, 241–42 (2005).
135 See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based
Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 52 n.164 (2008) (emphasizing the
importance of mimetic isomorphism to the dissemination of best business
practices).
136 Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 121, at 102 n.109.
137 Sokol, supra note 132, at 280.
138 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 648 (2004) (“As many
commentators point out, the extent of isomorphism across states is
remarkable . . . .”).
139 See Mizruchi & Fein, supra note 120, at 657 (“Coercive isomorphism is
driven by two forces: Pressures from other organizations on which a focal
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that the actor would like to acquire)140 or negative (something that
the actor would like to avoid).141 Entities align their institutions
because they are told to do so—by governments, by society, by
customers, or by any group on which those entities depend.142
The European Union (“EU”) offers a very clear example of the
process of coercive isomorphism. Membership in the EU offers
substantial benefits to potential members, including free access to a
very large market, inclusion in the Common Agricultural Policy,
infrastructure assistance, and a unified currency.143 Membership
also confers on countries a measurable degree of prestige and
legitimacy: “For many people in these nations, joining the EU was
a proud moment, symbolic of their democratic and economic
accomplishments and their reentry into the community of their free
European siblings.”144 Acceding to the EU, however, requires an
almost complete alignment of existing legal institutions with those
of the EU.145 The laws and regulations of an applicant must
organization is dependent and an organization’s pressure to conform to the
cultural expectations of the larger society.”).
140 See, e.g., Isin Guler et al., Global Competition, Institutions, and the Diffusion of
Organizational Practices: The International Spread of ISO 9000 Quality Certificates, 47
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 207, 212 (2002) (“[D]ependent organizations are likely to adopt
patterns of behavior sanctioned by the organizations that control critical
resources.”).
141 See, e.g., Tuttle & Dillard, supra note 129, at 393 (“If the influencing group
has sufficient power, change may be mandated.”).
142 See James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV.
218, 242–55 (2003) (discussing the coercive isomorphism effects resulting from the
imposition of social norms on nonprofit fiduciary behavior).
143 Natalie Shimmel, Welcome to Europe, But Please Stay Out: Freedom of
Movement and the May 2004 Expansion of the European Union, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
760, 763 (2006); see also Andrew Moravcsik & Milada Anna Vachudova, National
Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement 3 (Ctr. for European Studies, Working
Paper
No.
97,
2003),
available
at
http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu
/publications/docs/pdfs/Moravcsik_Vachudova.pdf (“East European states take
part in the laborious accession process because EU membership brings
tremendous economic and geopolitical benefits—particularly as compared to the
uncertain and potentially catastrophic costs of being left behind as others move
forward.”).
144 Shimmel, supra note 143, at 763.
145 See John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The European Union: Where
Is It Now?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 923, 951–52 (1996) (noting that acceding members may
not “question or substantially modify the institutional structure, scope, policies or
rules of . . . the Union”); Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 329, 332 (2004) (“[C]ountries acceding to the European Union must embrace the
acquis communitaire: To acquire the benefits of membership and avoid the costs of
exclusion, they must make the domestic policy and institutional changes
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comply in their entirety to the acquis communautaire of the EU—the
corpus of directives, rules, regulations, and interpretations created
by the EU over its lifetime.146
The possibility of acceding to the EU has transformed the
former Soviet countries of Central and Eastern Europe; those
seeking to join the EU have “recreate[d] themselves in the EU’s
image.”147 Indeed, “the outcome of research conducted so far on
the deployment and effectiveness of EU conditionality in the preaccession process strongly indicates that a credible membership
perspective has been a necessary condition for effective impact on
domestic change.”148 The former Soviet countries are not the only
nations that have substantially realigned institutions. Prior to
accession to the EU, military dictatorships ruled Greece, Portugal,
and Spain; “they were strongly encouraged to become democracies
by the enticement of EU membership.”149
Even strongly
democratic countries, such as Ireland, substantially changed laws
so as to align them with the EU’s requirements.150 Even countries
with accession hopes as controversial as Russia’s and Turkey’s
demanded by Brussels.”); see also Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Union: The
Accession Procedure for the Central European and Mediterranean States, 1 LOY. INT’L L.
REV. 15, 21–53 (2003) (describing and explaining in detail each step of the
accession process).
146 Shimmel, supra note 143, at 774; see generally Antje Wiener, The Embedded
Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance, 4 EUR. L.J.
294 (1998) (describing acquis communautaire).
147 Helen E. Hartnell, Subregional Coalescence in European Regional Integration,
16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 115, 127 (1997).
148 Amichai
Magen, The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European
Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383, 411 (2006)
(emphasis added). Magen emphasizes that research indicates that “a credible
prospect of EU accession coupled with low domestic costs of adaptation have
both been necessary as well as sufficient conditions for compliance.” Id. at 411–12.
149 Stuart E. Eizenstat, U.S. Relations with the European Union and the Changing
Europe, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 12 (1995); see Desmond Dinan, Fifty Years of
European Integration: A Remarkable Achievement, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1118, 1139
(2008) (“The impossibility of enjoying the economic benefits of EU membership
without being democratic and respecting fundamental rights strengthened
progressive forces in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, as those countries emerged
from dictatorial rule in the mid-1970s, and subsequently in Eastern Europe
following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.”).
150 See Bryan Mercurio, Abortion in Ireland: An Analysis of the Legal
Transformation Resulting from Membership in the European Union, 11 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 141, 179 (2003) (“Ireland operated under the misguided theory that it
could separate the economic benefits of EU membership from its social and moral
policies. It soon realized, however, that the EU brings an inseparable collection of
economic, social, and political values and benefits.”).
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have changed institutions so that those institutions align more
closely with those of the EU.151
5.

ISOMORPHISM AND TRADE SANCTIONS INTENDED TO CHANGE
BEHAVIOR

The language and analytics of sociology provide legal scholars
with new tools to explain and predict changes that can be
effectuated through the use of sanctions. Trade sanctions could
have an effect on each of the three processes of institutional
alignment described in the preceding Section.
5.1. Normative Isomorphism
Normative isomorphism occurs when actors learn together,
develop standards together, or join in existing standards.152
Comprehensive trade sanctions or embargos obviously obviate the
possibility for the targeted nation to participate in these processes.
Indeed, excluding the targeted nation and its citizens from
participation in “desirable”153 organizations could force them to
participate in organizations that hold values contrary to those of
the country imposing sanctions. This, in turn, could cause the
targeted country to align its institutions with those of the less
desirable organization.
It is possible that normative isomorphism has occurred in
Cuba.
Cuba has been excluded from participation in the
Organization of American States (“OAS”) since 1962 and is the
only nation in the Western Hemisphere that is not an active
member.154 On the other hand, Cuba did join the Soviet Union’s

151 See Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the
Death Penalty, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 547, 556 (2004) (“[M]oves toward eliminating the
death penalty in Turkey and Russia are most likely motivated not out of opinio
juris but rather in exchange for the benefits of membership in the economically
and politically advantageous clubs of the European Union and the Council of
Europe.”).
152 See supra Section 4.1.1.
153 In this case, “desirable” means desirable from the perspective of the
sanctioning country.
154 Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, The Third Summit of the Americas and
the Thirty-First Session of the OAS General Assembly, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 173, 176 n.16
(2002); see Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 58 (2001) (stating that the sanctions law “obligates the United
States to oppose Cuban participation in the OAS and in international financial
institutions”).
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Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.155 Following admission to
that Council, Cuba experienced a dramatic increase in the number
of Soviet and Eastern European technical advisors and economic
planners, thus increasing the likelihood of convergence in the
nature of Soviet and Cuban institutions.156 The collapse of the
Soviet Union did not deprive Cuba of nations with which it could
associate; Cuba has formed close relationships with Venezuela and
other nations whose norms probably do not represent those that
the United States would like Cuba to learn.157 Just as Cuba once
exchanged technical advisors with the Soviet bloc countries, it now
exchanges advisors with Chavez’s Venezuela.158
It is difficult to estimate the degree to which this level of
socialization caused Cuban institutions to move toward those of
the Communist bloc.159 One thing can be guessed with far more
certainty: the infusion of Soviet technical advisors did nothing to
align Cuban institutions with those considered desirable by the
United States.
5.2. Mimetic Isomorphism
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when entities mimic the
institutions of others.160 Entities tend to turn to mimicry during
155 Richard Szawlowski, Book Review, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 711 (reviewing
reference book MEZHDUNARODNYE EKONOMICHESKIJE I NAUCHNO-TEKHNICHESKIJE
ORGANIZATSII STRAN-CHLENOV SEV. SPRAVOCHNIK [THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF
COMECON] (V. V. Vorontnikov & D. A. Lebin eds., 1980)) (discussing the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (“COMECON”) and Cuba’s
membership).
156 See Lawrence H. Theriot & JeNelle Matheson, Soviet Economic Relations
with the Non-European CMEA: Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia, in A COMPENDIUM OF
PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 96TH CONG., 551, 555 (1979)
(describing the increase in technical and economic advisors).
157 See Larry Catá Backer, Odious Debt Wears Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy,
Problems, and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt Conceptions in Globalized
Economic Regimes, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 43 & n.184 (2007) (describing the
relationship between Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia in the Bolivarian Alternative
for Latin America).
158 See Luz Estella Nagle, Global Terrorism in Our Own Backyard: Colombia’s
Legal War Against Illegal Armed Groups, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 55
(2005) (describing the extent of the exchange between Venezuela and Cuba).
159 See Edward Yates, Central Planning Meets the Neighborhood: Land Use Law
and Environmental Impact Assessment in Cuba, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 653, 653–54 (2003)
(describing Cuba’s choice to align itself with the Soviet Union).
160 See supra Section 4.1.2.
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conditions of uncertainty, and tend to copy the institutions of those
with whom they have had repeated interaction.
One effect of a comprehensive trade sanction or embargo is that
it precludes the repeated interaction that may lead to mimicry.
Cuba, cut off from interaction with democratic nations, could not
easily copy those democratic nations’ institutions. On the other
hand, Cuba could easily copy the institutions of those nations who
did not comply with the United State’s sanctions, and in particular
with the Soviet countries. One vivid example of this is the Cuban
legal system, which President Fidel Castro ordered completely
rewritten.161 The development of a legal system almost always
requires mimicry—the development of a completely novel legal
system is a staggering undertaking.162 The Cuban legal system,
unsurprisingly, is a socialist legal system.163 Far from forcing Cuba
to imitate the legal systems of democratic countries, the trade
sanctions imposed by the United States virtually guaranteed that
Cuba would mimic those of the countries engaged in a cold war
with the United States.
5.3. Coercive Isomorphism
Coercive isomorphism describes the convergence of
institutions in response to incentives; these incentives can be either
negative or positive.164 Trade sanctions constitute a negative
incentive.
This Article does not purport to review the mass of economic
indicator-based literature evaluating the effectiveness of the United
States’ sanctions on Cuba. The mass of evidence, however,
suggests that punishment has not caused Cuba to change and in
fact has given Cuba’s regime a plausible excuse for further

161 It was unlikely that the existing Cuban legal system, developed during
periods of foreign domination or political turmoil, would have survived scrutiny
by the Cuban people.
162 See Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.
REV. 1, 27 (1974) (discussing the reception of law); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants
and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79, 80 (1976) (same). Watson points to the
wholesale reception of Roman law throughout Europe as an example of this
widespread process. ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 66–97 (1985).
163 See Jessica Garcia, Made In America: Latin American Consumers Meet Their
Maker, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 759, 761 (1998) (describing the infiltration of
Castro’s Socialist regime into the Cuban legal system).
164 See supra Section 4.1.1.
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repressing the liberties of individual Cubans.165 It is important to
understand the context in which these negative incentives are
imposed: Cubans do not have a democratic tradition to which they
long to return, most Cubans traditionally did not have access to
economic opportunity or to the markets, and Cubans who are old
enough to recall the pre-revolution relationship with the United
States are likely to remember organized crime and exploitation.166
The “punishment” of not interacting with the United States may
not seem overwhelmingly burdensome to many Cubans.167
On the other hand, lack of interaction with sanctioning nations
may actually enhance the perceived benefit of interaction with
non-sanctioning nations, or even lead to dependency on those
nations.168 Such was the case with Cuba. Cuba became a client
state of the Soviet Union,169 and on occasion acted in accordance
with the Soviet Union’s wishes rather than its own.170 Using the
language of sociologists, exclusion from association with
sanctioning states makes the positive incentives offered by nonsanctioning states more attractive and thus perversely increases the
likelihood of coercive isomorphism with the institutions of those
nations.
The corollary of this observation is that trade sanctions do not
offer, indeed they preclude, positive incentives for regime change.
Most examples of coercive isomorphism, however, are the result of
positive incentives. The EU’s significant effect on the institutions
of potential members, for example, is not the result of threats made
165 See James M. Cooper, Creative Problem Solving and the Castro Conundrum, 28
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 391, 421 (1998) (quoting former Canadian Prime Minister Jean
Chretien: “They’re just making it possible for Castro to stay in power, because he
has an excuse, he can blame the Americans.”).
166 See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
167 See Cooper, supra note 165, at 421–22 (explaining that the U.S. embargo
against Cuba does not put the Castro regime in jeopardy).
168 Theriot & Matheson, supra note 156, at 552 (“[E]xtensively isolated from
the non-Communist trading community, a small nation’s dependence on a major
power like the USSR inevitably grows; its autonomy in foreign policy is reduced,
and some degree of subservience to Soviet global interests becomes
unavoidable.”).
169 See Colin Crawford, Environmental Justice in Cuba: Capital Needs, Developing
a Tourist Infrastructure, and Liberty of Access to National Resources, 14 TRANSNAT’L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 55–56 (2004) (identifying Cuba as a former client state of
the Soviet Union and identifying some of the problems that accompanied that
status).
170 See Theriot & Matheson, supra note 156, at 552–53 (noting that Cuba only
reluctantly supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia).
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against those countries but instead is the result of substantial
incentives offered.171
5.4. A Lesson from Sociology
Sociological theory regarding changes toward convergence in
institutions offers a rigorous means of analyzing the probable
effects of trade sanctions. The preceding discussion also suggests a
potentially fatal weakness of unilateral sanctions. To the extent
that sanctions are not coordinated among every country in the
world, there will remain potential partners with whom the target
country may associate and on whom the target country may come
to depend. This will only enhance the probability of normative,
mimetic and even normative isomorphism. The convergence in
institutions, however, will not be with the institutions of the
sanctioning country. Instead, the convergence will be with the
institutions of countries that do not cooperate with the sanctioning
country, countries whose institutions are more likely to be
antithetical to those of the sanctioning country. Institutions shape
behavior. Thus, an imperfectly coordinated sanction may actually
be more likely to engender undesired behavior than it is to
engender the desired behavior.
6.

CONCLUSION

Trade sanctions have become a tool of choice in the last fifteen
years.172 The important interface between trade sanctions and the
international trade regime demands that legal scholars analyze
trade sanctions with every tool at their disposal. Positive legal
theory, economic theory, and political sciences including
international relations theory each provide useful perspectives.
The valuable contributions from sociology, however, are often
overlooked.
See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text.
See Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions,
26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 53 (2001) (noting the increasing frequency of threats of
unilateral sanctions given the prohibition of forcible interference in state affairs
under customary international law); Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts
Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2002) (noting the increasing frequency of
trade sanctions directed by the United Nations Security Council and requiring
compliance by all states); see also Shauna C. Bryce, Life Plus Seventy: The Extension
of Copyright Terms in the European Union and Proposed Legislation in the United States,
37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 525, 543 (1996) (noting in general that “[t]hreats of trade
sanctions, for example, are frequently used”).
171
172
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Some types of trade sanctions seek to change the behavior of
targeted nations, and in particular seek to align the behavior of
targeted nations with the “acceptable” behavior of the sanctioning
nation and its peers. Behavior is dependent on underlying
institutions, such as law. Institutional sociology offers theoretical
explanations as to why entities’ institutions will converge. As can
be demonstrated with the United States’ embargo of the Republic
of Cuba, theories of isomorphism can in fact explain the outcome
of these types of trade sanctions.
Theories of isomorphism can also predict the outcome of trade
sanctions. Theories of isomorphism offer a caution with respect to
unilateral trade sanctions. Unless those sanctions are carefully
coordinated with other international actors, each of the theories of
normative, mimetic, and even coercive isomorphism suggest that
trade sanctions may actually produce the opposite of the desired
outcome.
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